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DEATHS
Frank B. Kellogg, age 81, Minneapolis, former Secretary of State, United
States Senator, Ambassador to Great Britain and Judge on World Court, died
December, 1937.
Newton D. Baker, age 66, Cleveland, former Secretary of War, died De-
cember 24, 1937.
Harry G. Leslie, age 59, Indianapolis, former Governor of Indiana, died
December 10, 1937.
Thomas Van Buskirk, age 76, Bloomfield, former circuit court judge, died
December 10, 1937.
Fred H. Bowers, age 67, Huntington, died December 14, 1937.
Earl Rowley, age 52, LaPorte, died December 11, 1937.
Lon Conner, age 64, Connersville, died December 8, 1937.
William F. Calverly, age 69, Vincennes, Judge of Knox Superior Court,
died December 13, 1937.
Marsh T. Lewis, age 52, Princeton, died January 8, 1938.
Samuel B. Wells, age 77, Scottsburg, died January 1, 1937.
Thomas Phillips, age 73, Brazil, died November 28, 1937.
John W. Talbot, age 68, South Bend, died December 14, 1937.
Charles S. Royce, Versailles, Indiana, age 72, died December 3, 1937.
RECENT CASE NOTES
COGNOvrr NOTES-COLLATERAL SEcurry-Plaintiff seeks to foreclose a real
estate mortgage given by the defendant as security for certain promissory notes
which contained a provision irrevocably authorizing any attorney to confess
judgment in any court without service of process. The trial court refused to
allow foreclosure of the mortgage on the ground that since cognovit notes are
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invalidated by statute in Indiana, the accompanying mortgage must also fail.
Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court. HELD: The mortgage and cognovit
clause were distinct transactions, and the illegal cognovit clause could be sep-
arated from the valid acts of the parties so that the mortgage is enforceable.1
At common law 2 and by statute3 most states have taken the position that a
person.can waive his right to service of process in the interest of expediting
justice. However, Indiana and a few other states at common law refused to
allow judgments taken under such a power of attorney to stand on the theory
that it is against public policy to permit a defendant to bargain away his right
to be heard and to take no day.in court.4 The legislatures which have refused
to sanction this practice have usually passed statutes whose only effect is to
invalidate the clause conferring power of attorney, and the instrument remains
enforceable according to the ordinary processes of the law.5 The Indiana
statutes stand alone in not only avoiding the entire note but in declaring penal
liabilities against anyone who makes, endorses, or attempts to enforce a cog-
novit note. 6
It is interesting to note how the Indiana courts, in deciding the few cases
which have thus far arisen regarding the application and interpretation of the
statutes, have attempted to cut down their drastic language by, in effect, pro-
ducing no greater penalty than that which results in states where only the
cognovit clause is invalidated, and the note itself can be enforced.
In Fodor v. Popp'7 the court said that a promissory note containing blanks
at the time of delivery which, if filled, would make it a cognovit note, cannot,
1 Peoples National Bank & Trust Co. et al. v. Pora et al. (Ind. 1937),
9 N. E. (2d) 83.
2 Cross v. Moffat (1888), 11 Colo. 210, 17 P. 771; Saunders v. Lipscomb
(1804), 90 Va. 647, 19 S. E. 450; Hutchinson v. Palmer (1906), 147 Ala. 517,
40 So. 339; Hazel v. Jacobs (1909), 78 N. J. L. 459, 75 A. 903, 27 L. R A.
(N. S.) 1066.
a Little v. Dyer (1891), 138 Il. 272, 27 N. E. 905; Mason v. Ward (1907),
80 Vt. 290, 67 A. 820; Vennum v. Holmberg (1911), 51 Colo. 306, 117 P. 169;
Moe v. Schaffer (1921), 150 Minn. 114, 184 N. W. 785; Ann. Cas., 1914 A. 645.
4 Irose v. BaIla (1914), 181 Ind. 491, 104 N. E. 851; Egley v. T. B.
Bennett & Co. (1924), 196 Ind. 50, 145 N. E. 830; 40 A. L. R. 436; Farquhar
v. Dehaven (1912), 70 W. Va. 738, 75 S. E. 65; First National Bank v. White
(1909), 220 Mo. 717, 120 S. W. 36, where the court said: "The so-called
authorization would certainly not be recognized as valid under the laws of this
state . . . because it is against the policy of our law to permit a man, when
entering into an obligation, to bargain away his right to be heard in court,
should a question ever arise between him and his adversary in relation to it."
5 Hendrickson v. Fries (1883), 45 N. J. L. 555; Aultman v. Mead (1901),
109 Ky. 583, 60 S. W. 294; Jemison v. Freed (1909), 161 Ala. 598, 50 So. 52;
Carroll v. Gore (1932), 106 Fla. 582, 143 So. 633. Sec. 4495, C. G. L. (1927)
of Florida provides: "All powers of attorney for confessing or suffering
judgment made or to be made by any person whatsoever in this state, before
such action brought, shall be null and void."
Freeman, judgments, (5th ed. 1925), § 1302; 15 R. C. L. 648. For an
excellent discussion of this problem see Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 647.
0 Sec. 2-2904, Burns' 1933, after declaring it illegal to execute or procure to
be executed a written instrument containing a warrant of attorney to confess
judgment without service of process says, "Any and all contracts, stipulations
and powers of attorney given or entered into before a cause of action on such
promise to pay shall have accrued, shall be void." Sec. 2-2906 defines a cognovit
note and prescribes the penalty for its execution or attempt at enforcement.
7 (1931), 93 Ind. App. 429, 178 N. E. 695; Discussed in 7 Ind. L. J. 447.
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in absence of evidence that parties, when the note was signed, gave authority
for filling blanks, be construed as a cognovit note and hence invalid. In other
words the court adopted the more' liberal and commercially expedient rule that
words would not be supplied by construction which would make the note void,
and that it is not to be presumed that the intention was to execute an instru-
ment that could not be' enforced. A strong argument could be made for the
opposite result on the theory that when blanks are left in a promissory note at
the time of its delivery, the holder has the implied authority to fill in such
blanks, and that on failure to do so the instrument will be read and construed
as though the blanks were filled in comformable to the text of the instrument.8
In Phend v. Midwest Engineering Co.,9 although the purchaser under a
conditional sales contract executed cognovit notes for part of the purchase
price, the court allowed such contract to be enforced on the theory that the
contract and the cognovit notes were distinct transactions, and that the illegal
cognovit clause contained in the notes could be separated from the valid acts
of the parties. The court recognized the rule that instruments executed at the
same time, by the same parties, and for the same purpose, in the eyes of the
law were one instrument and should be read together;'O but held that rule,
as applicable to the existing facts, did not make the conditional sales contract
void.
The principal case involved a problem somewhat similar to the Phend case,
and the court applied analogous reasoning in reaching the conclusion that a
mortgage given to secure invalid cognovit notes is a separate and distinct in-
strument, although executed simultaneously with the notes and concerning the
same matters. A reading of our cognovit note statutes does not reveal what
the legislative intent was regarding enforcement of the original contract or of
collateral security, but the court reached a very desirable construction when it
said, "It is clear that the purpose of the statute is to prevent judgments to be
taken without the service of process and by virtue of a power of attorney
executed in advance. It is not the purpose of the statute to enable a person
to escape the payment of an honest debt."
Our decisions throw no light on the subject of why the Indiana legislature
went one step further than other states so as to make the cognovit note void.
The general tenor of the statutory language would indicate that a severe
penalty is intended. If such is the case, the courts are doing their best to miti-
gate the hardship of the creditor by allowing him to resort to the enforcement
of the original contract or to foreclosure of collateral security. If the courts
are endeavoring to prevent the escape from payment of an honest debt, the
courts might extend their liberal tendency to allow a recovery of the debt
itself in indebitatus assumpsit.l'
8 Sec. 14 of Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, Burns' 1933, sec. 19-114.
9 (1931), 13 Ind. App. 165, 177 N. E. 879.
10 6 R. C. L. § 240, p. 850.
11 Compare the situation which exists when by statute a usurious note is
declared void, and it has been given for a pre-existing valid debt. In Rice v.
Welling (1830), 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 595, the court said, "The power relates
wholly to the contract and makes that utterly void; but if there was once a
valid subsisting debt, that cannot be destroyed by a void or invalid security."
See also Silverstein v. Taubenkimmel (1924), 205 N. Y. S. 241; 66 C. J. p. 243.
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Our policy of forbidding the execution of cognovit notes can be sufficiently
realized by the invalidation solely of the cognovit feature. Although the
Supreme Court through circumvention has reached a very desirable interpre-
tation, it might be advisable for the legislature to make our statutes analogous
to those which invalidate only the warranty of attorney to confess judgment
without service of process, and which thus leave the note itself enforceable by
the customary methods of procedure. This would tend to secure uniformity in
interstate commercial transactions,1 2 and to settle moot questions not yet de-
cided such as what might be the result if the original contract provided for the
giving of cognovit notes, or if the mortgage also contained a cognovit clause.1 3
H. J. B.
SURETYSHIP-SUBROGATION-EFFECT OF RELEASE OF SURETY AFTER PARTIAL
SATIFAcoN-Plaintiff and the Bank entered into an agreement with relation to
the preferred stock of the Realty Company by which the Bank purchased the
stock as trustee and the plaintiff guaranteed the payment of dividends as well
as redemption of the stock as provided by the stock agreement. Later, in order
to raise money for repairs, a reorganization of the Realty Company was
affected. As part of the reorganization plan plaintiff was released from all
further liability on his guaranty. He had already paid $15,000 to the com-
pany to be used in payment of dividends and in retirement of the stock. When
the Realty Company went into the hands of a receiver, plaintiff filed a claim
for the money advanced, claiming to be subrogated to the rights of the pre-
ferred stockholders whose stock had been retired with the money advanced.
Held: plaintiff was not entitled to the preference which the stockholders had on
dissolution.1
The first question arising involves the effect of the contract of guaranty in
the first instance. On this point it is generally held that such contracts of
guaranty are valid and can be enforced with the limitation that the guaranty
must be by a third person 2 and not by the corporation itself. 3 If the guaranty
is made by the corporation itself, it is denied effect; for it is contrary to
public policy for a corporation to pay dividends except out of earnings, and a
12"The Cognovit Note Act," by G. A. Farabaugh and Walter Arnold,
5 Indiana L. J1. 93; "The Indiana Cognovit Note Statute," by Bernard C.
Gavit, 5 Indiana L. J1. 208.
13 In Phend v. Midwest Engineering Co., the court merely said, "There is
no stipulation in the conditional-sales contract that the several promissory notes
were to contain the usual terms and conditions of a cognovit or judgment note."
In the principal case the court said, "There is no stipulation in the mortgage
that the note given as evidence of the debt should contain the cognovit feature."
I Ellis v. Thompson (1937), 8 N. E. (2d) 430, Indiana Appellate Court.2 Austin v. Wright (1930), 156 Wash. 24, 286 P. 48; McCampbell v. Obear
(1915), 27 Cal. App. 97, 148 P. 942; Scholbe v. Schuchardt (1920), 292 Ill.
529, 127 N. E. 169; Hornor v. McDonald (1899), 52 La. Ann. 396, 27 So. 91;
Rogers v. Burr (1898), 105 Ga. 432, 31 S. E. 438.
3 In some cases a guaranty by the corporation is construed, not as being
void, but merely to mean that the dividends are cumulative; Prouty v. Michigan
Southern Ry. Co. (1874), 1 Hun. (N. Y.) 655; Boardman v. Lake Shore Ry.
Co. (1881), 84 N. Y. 157; Lockhart v. Van Alstyne (1875), 31 Mich. 76.
